The Philosophy Café

The Philosophy Café at Harvard Book Store is a monthly gathering meant for the informal, relaxed, philosophical discussion of topics of mutual interest to participants. No particular expertise is required to participate, only a desire to explore philosophy and its real-world applications. More information can be found at www.philocafe.org.

The Philosophy Café is held on the third Wednesday of each month at 7:30 in the Used Book department on the lower level of Harvard Book Store.

This Month: The Unreality of Physical Reality

Henry Margenau was a physicist and self-taught philosopher of science who advocated a view of physical science that likely comes as a surprise to many of his readers:  In his book,  The Nature of Physical Reality (1950), he argues that, although the entities of science are usually viewed as existing in nature, and merely discovered by mankind, such entities are better understood as being intellectual creations of science.    

The arguments for and against such a view have a long history in western philosophy: the argument can be viewed as idealism vs. realism.  The problem with physical realism is that we really don't have a good idea of what entities are real; the ones favored by physics seem to change so repeatedly that confidence in current theoretical concepts is difficult, if not impossible, to justify.  The problem is compounded by the known failure of current concepts to form a coherent whole (e.g., over all size scales from subatomic to cosmic) and their evident inability to explain various observed basic "facts."  Among these facts are the accelerating cosmic expansion now attributed to so-called dark energy, the relative masses of subatomic particles, and the relative strengths of the several different types of forces among those particles.  Equally problematic is the alternative claim that the real is that which is (more or less) immediately given by sense impressions.  After all, the latter are ephemeral, unconfirmed, often apparently inconsistent, and intrinsically personal. 

Instead, Margenau turns to a restricted class of mental concepts, or constructs.  A scientifically valid construct, which he terms a "verifact," is a construct that both meets several metaphysical/epistemological criteria, and has been verified, along with other constructs, by an open-ended process of testing their collective predictions against careful observations.  According to Margenau, "An external object is the simplest construct which we habitually set over against most kinds of sensory awareness.  Others are geometric forms, numbers, and most of the refined entities of modern physics."   Each verifact must have lawful logical connections, at least a degree of generality, and elegance, too.  In addition, to be considered elements of physical reality, a verifact must be: 1. Enduring, even when not observed, although not necessarily eternal or unchanging; 2. Thing-like, as distinct from a thought, (i.e, not intrinsically private); and 3. Efficacious, i.e., capable of having effects. 

The key question to be discussed is whether this view of physical reality is intellectually acceptable (if not entirely satisfying) and adequate for the practice and understanding of physical science.  To mention one possible objection to any similarly idealist view, would we be just as foolish to hold that reality consists only of verified concepts as to accept as real only entities given by sense impressions?  After all, in either case it would seem that physical reality could then only exist in the presence of consciousness.  Such an inference is more compatible with theism or mysticism than with cosmic and biological evolution, and hence is far from conducive to scientific progress. 

Readings:

Margenau, Henry  The Nature of Physical Reality (1950)

Chakravartty, Anjan, "Scientific Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Defines scientific realism and presents arguments for and against it. 

Downing, Lisa, "George Berkeley", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Outlines the ideas of philosophy's most famous advocate of idealism. 

Plantinga, Alvin, "Religion and Science", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (revized, Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Briefly states the problems in defining "science," with examples including the electron and the big bang, in support of a theist view of reality.   

Frigg, Roman and Hartmann, Stephan, "Models in Science", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) More detailed, and with many references to more recent philosophical debates.   

Whitehead, Alfred N., Science and the Modern World A widely cited, historically organized examination of the development of science, couched in terms similar to those later used by Margenau, but in which "the notion of material, as fundamental, is replaced by that of organic synthesis."